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NOTES
ASSIGNMENT OF MECHANICS' LIENS
The Code of Civil Procedure designates those who are entitled to a mechanics'
lien,' and specifies how the notice of claim of lien should be filed.2 A lien cor-
rectly filed by one authorized to do so is assignables and will accompany the debt
it secures as an incident of that debt.4 An inchoate (unfied) lien receives a dif-
ferent treatment from the courts. It is well settled, though not unquestioned,5 that
such a lien is not assignable.6 It is the purpose of this note to explore the founda-
tion for this distinction between perfected and inchoate liens and to consider the
feasibility of eliminating this distinction.
The Leading Case
The first California case on the question of the assignability of an inchoate
mechanics' lien was Mills v. LaVeme Land Co. 7 The court claimed that the
weight of authority was that the personal element of the lien prevented an assign-
ment.8 As authority the court cited cases from Iowa,9 Michigan,' 0 New York,"
Washington,' 2 and Wisconsin.' 3 If the strength of Mills was made to rely on the
law in those jurisdictions today, it would be weak
The decision cited from Wisconsin did not support the result in Mills.' 4 Sub-
sequently both the Iowa' 5 and Michigan' 6 courts declared the inchoate right to a
mechanics' lien assignable. Neither court made any mention of the personal ele-
ment in their overruling opinions. The present Washington eoce' 7 explicitly
I CAL. CODE CIv. PRoc. § 1180.
2 CAL. CoDE Crv. PRoc. § 1193.1(j).
3 Rauer v. Fay, 110 Cal. 361, 42 Pac. 902 (1895); Duncan v. Hawn, 104 Cal. 10,
37 Pac. 626 (1894).
4 Union Supply Co. v. Morriss, 220 Cal. 331, 30 P.2d 394 (1934); Mitchell v.
Shoreridge Oil Co., 24 Cal. App. 2d 382, 75 P.2d 110 (1938).
5 See McClung v. Paradise Gold Mining Co., 164 Cal. 517, 129 Pac. 774 (1913).
B McCrea v. Johnson, 104 Cal. 224, 37 Pac. 902 (1894); Mills v. LaVeme Land Co.,
97 Cal. 254, 32 Pac. 169 (1893); Burr v. Peppers Cotton Lumber Co., 91 Cal. App.
268, 266 Pac. 1025 (1928).
797 Cal. 254, 32 Pac. 169 (1893).
8 Contra, Smoot v. Checketts, 41 Utah 211, 125 Pac. 412 (1912).
9 Brown v. Smith, 55 Iowa 31, 7 N.W. 401 (1880) (no reference to personal
element).
10 Fitzgerald v. Trustees, 1 Mich. N.P. 243 (1870).
1 Rollin v. Cross, 45 N.Y. 766 (1871) (no attempt to define personal element or
explain its origin).
12 Dexter Horton & Co. v. Sparkman, 2 Wash. 165, 25 Pac. 1070 (1891).
'3 Caldwell v. Lawrence, 10 Wis. 331 (1860).
14 Ibid. This case dealt with an assignment of a perfected lien, and denied the
assignee's right to enforce it in his own name. This has never been the California
position. See Mitchell v. Shoreridge Oil Co., 24 Cal. App. 2d 382, 75 P.2d 110 (1938).
15 Peatman v. Centerville Light Co., 105 Iowa 1, 74 N.W. 689 (1898).
'6 McAllister v. Des Rochers, 132 Mich. 381, 93 N.W. 887 (1903).
17 WAsn. Rav. CoDE § 60.04.080 (1961).
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permits the assignment of a mechanics' lien or the right to a lien. The New York
code' 8 allows the assignment of a filed lien only. There has never been a similar
statutory limitation in this State.
The case law and statutes of other jurisdictions are of no more value in refut-
ing Mills than they were in supporting it. Mechanics' lien laws have no root or
counterpart in common law, 19 but depend entirely upon legislation for their
existence. 20 Statutes vary greatly between states, and no decision can be strong
precedent unless considered in the light of the law in that state. But the corn-
panson is of value to demonstrate the present approach towards the problem in
jurisdictions that at one time were in accord with the California rule.
The Mills court made no attempt to define the personal element of a mechan-
ics' lien. Perhaps it had in mind the idea expressed in later opmions2 ' that the
entire purpose of mechanics' lien laws is to secure payment for the laborer or
matenalman. Whatever the personal element is, in Califormia it has never pre-
vented one other than a laborer or materialman from enforcing a mechanics'
lien.22 It seems likely that the court related the personal element to the statutory
requirements for filing the lien. 28 Though the Code of Civil Procedure section
1187 which was analyzed in Mills has since been repealed24 and replaced,25 the
phraseology has been substantially retained so that the court's reasoning remains
valid when applied to the new section. The requirement still exists that the claim
be signed or verified by the claimant or someone on his behalf2 6 and include a
description of the work done or material furnished by him and the name of the
person by whom he was employed or to whom he furnished material. The court
reasoned that since the assignee himself is neither employed nor a supplier, he is
unable to file a claim describing his own contribution to the improvement upon
which the lien is sought. This mability to literally comply with the statute prevents
perfection of the right to a mechanics lien by an assignee.
It is evident that the courts have not erred in following the rule of the Mills
case. The result is patently correct in view of our Code of Civil Procedure. But,
by accepting the case in its entirety, they have perpetuated the idea of a personal
element which somehow prevents assignment of an inchoate lien. This is a fiction
which has never been explained or justified.
Recommendation
No law should be changed for the sake of change alone, nor should a new law
be recommended without attention being paid to the constitutional ramifications.
18 N.Y. LmN LAw § 14.
19 3 PowELL, BEAL PRoPEiTr § 483 (1952).
2oSpney v. Griffith, 98 Cal. 149, 32 Pac. 974 (1893); Stanislaus Lumber Co. v.
Pike, 51 Cal. App. 2d 54, 124 P.2d 190 (1942); Holm v. Bramwell, 20 Cal. App. 2d
332, 67 P.2d 114 (1937).
21Nolte v. Smith, 189 Cal. App. 2d 140, 11 Cal. Rptr. 261 (1961); Bay Lumber
Co. v. Pickerng, 120 Cal. App. 163, 7 P.2d 371 (1932).22 Miltimore v. Nofziger Bros. Lumber Co., 150 Cal. 790, 90 Pac. 114 (1907).
2 8 After considering whether allowing assignment of a laborer's lien was desirable,
the court said in conclusion, "At all events, a court can neither make nor amend a
statute." 97 Cal. at 257, 32 Pac. at 170.
24 Cal. Stat. 1951, ch. 1159, § 4, at 2958.
25 CAL. ConE Crv. Pioc. § 1193.1(j).
2 65ee Parke & Lacy Co. v. Inter Nos Oil Co., 147 Cal. 490, 82 Pac. 51 (1905)
(agent); Jones v. Kruse, 138 Cal. 613, 72 Pac. 146 (1903) (attorney).
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